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CLINARD AND WADE
present indicating the type of criminal behavior
characterized by Reckless as "behavior of the
moment" in response to certain situations. Much
teen-age vandalism appears to be of this kind; it
is extemporaneous behavior, adventitious and
fortuitous in character, an outgrowth of the rest-
less and exhuberant nature of the adolescent boy.
In the evening, between five or six, we was out to
Center (this center had been burned)
messin' around. We was gonna play some ball. It was
gettin' too dark for that, so one of us suggested to go
in; so we went in .... Climbed up on the rest room
roof. See, it used to be a school, that's where the exits
outside from the restrooms were. We climbed up on
there and went in through the window.... Well,
first we went up and we thought we'd see what the Teen
Town room looked like. Went up there, it wasn't
bothered or burnt too much-floor was a little weak,
dirty. Then we come back downstairs-we was gonna
go in the art room but we couldn't get in there, the
floor, it was burnt through. There was, oh, about an
eighth of an inch of wood left. So we couldn't get in
there. Uh-we just went messin' around. Started
throwin' rocks .... From what we heard they was
gonna tear the building down, build one the full length
of the lot down there .... About in there an hour; just
went around-throw one or two (rocks) ... pretty
soon we were going like mad .... While we were doing
it we didn't think nothing about doing it because, like
I say, what we heard they was going to tear the whole
building down and I didn't think they would save
them (windows)-big percentage of them were cracked
and discolored, anyway .... What we was doing there
would be about three of us outside and three of us in-
side and we would have wars, throwing rocks back and
forth at each other .... I guess anybody likes to get in
trouble once in a while ... not actually go out to look
for trouble, but I mean at the time we thought it was
fun until the police came; that was all.
On the other hand, the differential social expec-
tations as to the roles of boys and girls are impor-
tant in the inhibition of destructive behavior by
girls. Since American culture does not place the
same inhibitions on the boy's outward expression
of his feelings, positive or negative, as it does on
that of girls, the male. youth, as one author has
suggested, often appears to feel it essential to be
self-directive in order to be considered masculine
and acceptable to his peers.34 Participation in
vandalism is one way of meeting these needs for
autonomy and peer group acceptance.
3RECKLESS, op. cit., p. 73.
34 See AILEEN SCHOEPPE, Sex Differences in Adoles-
cent Socialization, JouR. or Soc. PSYCHOL., 38 (No-
vember 1953), 175-185.
Fundamentally related is the frustration felt by
the adolescent in a culture in which his role and
status lack a well-defined normative structure.
Moreover, there is little consensus on values and
no consistency in adult behavior which might
serve as guideposts. This absence of dominant and
clearly defined norms, coupled with the factor of
peer group loyalty with its attendant norms and
values, results in conflict between the adolescent
and adult authority figures, usually his parents and
teachers. The consequence is behavior often termed
delinquent by the adult world, while the adolescent
defines it in terms of conformity to peer group
expectations .
5
This difference in the definition of behavior is
true of vandalism. Whereas the adult world thinks
of the teen-age vandal as a delinquent, the vandal
may often have an entirely different self-concep-
tion. His self image is frequently that of a
prankster:
We did all kinds of dirty tricks for fun. We'd see a
sign, "Please keep the street clean," but we'd tear it
down and say, "We don't feel like keeping it clean."
One day we put a can of glue in the engine of a man's
car. We would always tear things down. That would
make us laugh and feel good, to have so many jokes.31
One time.., four or five of us boys went to an apart-
ment just being built, took a whole wall of cement
down. We took a chisel and knocked down hundreds of
cinder blocks, just mischievous. We went to old houses,
broke windows ..... In one house we found a big
victrola. We threw it down the stairs, we pushed down
the bannister, we broke the chandelier. We didn't steal
anything, just broke things .... I had to do it so they
wouldn't call me chicken.H7
The fact that often nothing is stolen during such
vandalism tends to re-enforce the vandal's concep-
tion of himself as merely a prankster and not a
delinquent. Some writers have pointed this out as
a distinguishing characteristic of the vandal when
compared with other property offenders, assuming
that since nothing is taken vandalism has a non-
utilitarian function. However, these acts often do
have a real meaning and utility for the participants,
even though the reasons for participation are not
35 For a criticism of the view that adolescent culture
is in conflict with its adult counterpart, see FREDERICK
ELaIN AND WrLnum A. WESTLEY, The Myth of Adoles-
cent Culture, AxiRn. SOCIOL. REv., 20 (December 1955),
680-684.
3 6 
FREDERICK M. THRASHER, THE GANG (2nd Edi-
tion; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936),
pp.94f.
BENjAMIN FINE, 1,000,000 DELINQUENTS (New
York: World Publishing Company, 1955), pp. 36f.
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DELINEATION OF VANDALISM
expressed. Property destruction appears to func-
tion for the adolescent as a protest against his
ill-defined role and ambiguous status in the social
structure. Although role frustration is basic to this
protest, the nature of the frustration differs as to
the position of the vandal in the social structure
as implied in this statement by a sixteen year old
delinquent.
Well, he accused us of stealing some stuff out of his
joint. He didn't come right out and say it was us, but
the way he talked he made it sound like it-par-
ticularly us .... Yeah, we was kidding him about an
old rifle he had in there, about ninety years old, and he
wanted fifteen dollars for it and the stock on it was all
cracked up and everything. And we kept kidding his
mother-she's in there (the store) with him-and we
kept kidding her, and old Gay (the store owner),
himself, come over there and started raising the devil,
blowing off steam and everything. We didn't like it too
well. We left and came back later .... I told him (his
companion) let's go down and break those windows.
He said OK and we went down there and picked up
some rocks along the way. We got down there and
stood in front of the place till there weren't any cars
very close to it and we threw the rocks and ran .... I
guess you gotta get into something once in a while or
you don't live right out there. It didn't seem like then
that it would amount to this much.
SUMARY
It has been pointed out that more concentration
of research on types of delinquency is needed.
Rather than grouping all kinds of delinquencies
and delinquents into a heterogeneous category
designated as "juvenile delinquents" and com-
paring this with an equally omnibus one labeled
"juvenile non-delinquents," efforts should be
directed toward a fuller understanding of the act
itself and the kind of juvenile who predominantly
commits this type of offense. The findings of such
typological comparisons could conceivably be of
help in the formulation of more specific theories
of delinquent behavior and social control.
Vandalism has certain dimensions, specifically
the community's definition of the act and its toler-
ance limits when property destruction occurs. Also
of importance is the social setting in which the
offense takes place. Whether or not there is a well-
defined field in which vandalism is a permissible
act has much to do with its occurrence and direc-
tion. Not only is it an important delinquency,
judging from community reaction and financial
cost, but vandalism is also illustrative of what has
been called "behavior of the moment" in response
to certain situations.
Research on vandalism has been largely ex-
plorative and descriptive without a unifying frame
of reference and testable hypotheses. Conse-
quently, it is proposed that property destruction
be examined within a sociological framework of
adolescent behavior. From this perspective van-
dalism is seen as one expression of the frustration
felt by teen-age boys in their attempts to achieve
autonomy and a satisfying self-conception in a
culture where the adolescent's role and status lack
a normative structure.
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PROBLEMS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT
HENRY NUNBERG
The author received his degree in law from the Harvard Law School in 1957. The following article
was written for the Seminar on "Problems of Juvenile Delinquency" which was given by Professor
Sheldon Glueck.-EDITOR.
INTRODUCTION
Almost sixty years have passed since the first
juvenile court was founded in the United States.
During that time, the court has become an
integral part of the law-enforcement system in the
United States. It exists in many forms: as a juvenile
session of a district court, as a separate court
system, or as part of a Domestic Relations or
Family Court scheme. The jurisdictional limits
and organizational lines of these courts vary from
state to state, and even within a single state. But
in the course of its development, the juvenile
court has in many communities wandered far
afield from the traditional areas in which a court of
law functions. The juvenile court is no longer
simply a court of law which dispenses impartial
and blind justice; rather it has become for many
communities the central agency to handle all the
problems created by juvenile crime and delin-
quency. Thus, the court takes on a dual role: it
attempts to function both as a court of law and as
a social service agency. The basic problem facing
the juvenile court today is that of clarifying its
role in society, in order to determine which role is
to predominate, and in which of the two capacities
it will function. It is the opinion of the author that
if the juvenile court accepts the role of social
service agency, it cannot retain its vitality as a
court of law. It is felt that the court, in order to
preserve important social values, must retain its
essentially juridical nature.
PART A-I
Much has been written about the multiplication
of functions in the juvenile court. Many writers
have simply assumed that the court is judicial in
nature, and have discussed its functions on this
basis.' Some, however, have maintained that the
juvenile court is not a court at all, but a kind of
1 E.g., GusTAv L. ScHRAmm, Philosophy of the Juvenile
Court, 261 TE ANNALS Or TE AM. Ac.D. OF POL.
AND Soc. Sci. 101 (1949).
hospital for children afflicted with the disease of
delinquency.2 One writer has suggested that the
name of the juvenile court be changed, so that the
word "court" does not appear in its title.3 Other
writers have discussed at length the question of
whether the juvenile court is actually a judicial
body, or whether it is, rather, an administrative
agency masquerading as a court.
4
These conflicting views result from incon-
sistencies in the theories that gave birth to the
juvenile court. They were not, however, as ap-
parent at its inception as they became later on.
Holmes has written that the criminal law sprang
from the necessity of finding a social means to
satisfy the demands for retribution and vengeance
created by the perpetration of anti-social acts.5
The juvenile court movement seems to have had
its roots in the desire to remove such elements from
the law as it related to the treatment of children
who committed crimes. It seemed unfair to expose
childish offenders to the humiliation, censure and
degradation accompanying criminal trial and
punishment. Children were to be protected from
the vengeance of society.
The movement was started and advocated in many
places not so much from any legal theory, scientific
motive, or any considerations of democracy or social
economy, as from humanitarian considerations based
on sentiment, sympathy, morality or humanity.6
2 e.g., PAUL W. ALEXANDER, Confessions of a Very
Juvenile Judge, in Probation and Parole Progress,
N.P.P.A. YEARBOOK, 1941; for an extended use of the
hospital analogy, see WrLLIAms G. LONG, The Relation
of the Juvenile Court to Other Agencies, 35 J. CRrm. L.
& CRnIN. 55 (1944).
3 GLENN R. WINTERS, Modern Court Services for
Youths and Juveniles, 35 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 112 (1949).
4 FREDERICK W. KILLIAN, The Juvenile Court As An
Institution, 261 TIE ANNALS OF THE Am. AcAD. or
POL. AND SoC. ScI. 89 (1949); PAUL W. TAPPAN,
JuvENiLE DELINQUENCY (New York, 1949), Part IH.
10. W. HoL~ms, JR., THE CoMMoN LAW (Boston,
1883), Lectures I & II.
6 H. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (Chapel Hill, 1927), p. 22.
THE JUVENILE COURT
The first objective was to soften the conditions of
punishment under which children convicted of
crimes suffered. Only gradually did the idea evolve
that stigmatization of children as criminals was
itself an injustice; the final step was to remove the
treatment of anti-social children from the criminal
courts altogether. The history of the juvenile
court movement has been recorded elsewhere.7
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that at
the time the first juvenile court in the United
States was created in Chicago, the study of
dynamic psychology had not yet taken on major
proportions. The necessity for utilizing the
knowledge of the expert in dealing with behavior
problems had not yet been recognized. To those
people concerned with the juvenile court, it seemed
that love of-children and common sense were the
only prerequisites necessary for the successful
treatment of most juvenile delinquents. A sensi-
tive man sitting on the bench as judge, together
with a probation officer who had a good store of
common sense, were thought sufficient to treat
most delinquents brought before the court. Those
children who did not respond to this treatment
could be handled in the institutions run by state
departments of welfare or private agencies,
staffed, ideally, with educators and disciplinarians.
Factors such as environment and physical health
were recognized as the causes of delinquency. A
subtler theory of causation, gained through a
deeper understanding of human behavior and
social mechanisms, was as yet undeveloped. In the
next few years, however, there was an awakening
of the social sciences and, especially in psychology,
great advances were made toward a fuller under-
standing of the motivations of human behavior.
The growth of the new sciences began a process
of reexamination into the purposes and methods of
that part of the laws which attempts to govern
anti-social behavior. The discovery of the un-
conscious and its tremendous influence over
human behavior brought into question legal
theories of responsibility.8 The juvenile court
movement was in part the outgrowth of a feeling
that children who in the past had been considered
7 H. 1-. Lou, op. cit. For a sketch of the development
of ameliorative treatment of young criminals as well as
of the juvenile court generally, see TERs AND
REINExANN, THE CHALLENGE Op DELINQUENCY (New
York, 1950), Chapters II and IX.
8 For a brief account of the development of the law
of responsibility in one area of the criminal law, see
JOHN BIGGS, THE GurTY MIND: PSYCH ATRY AND THE
LAW op HomcmE (New York, 1955).
criminally responsible for their anti-social behavior
were not in reality capable of forming the intent
necessary to perform a criminal act.9 By question-
ing contemporary theories as to the general
nature of man's responsibility for his actions, the
new concepts gave added impetus to the philosophy
of legal non-responsibility of the juvenile offender
for his conduct. Science, therefore, supplied a
rationalization for the existence of the juvenile
court that was lacking in legal precedent. Whether
or not the early chancery practices supposedly at
the root of the juvenile court idea did in fact supply
an adequate justification for the juvenile court and
its practices, modem social theories demanded
some form of specialized treatment for children in
trouble with the law.
Just as the growth of administrative law was
fostered by the needs of a complex and expanding
social structure, so was the growth of the juvenile
court 0 In the juvenile court, however, problems
arose that were not as evident, or at least not as
acute, in the administrative agencies. As Tappan
has pointed out, "... . the control over the liberty
of the defendant and the potential influence on his
personality through court handling... are greatly
in excess of the powers ordinarily entrusted to the
administrative agency-or to courts of equity.""
Having been created as a replacement for the
criminal courts in a certain class of cases, the
juvenile courts retain powers over the fate of the
individuals brought before it more akin to those of
the criminal court than to the powers of any other
institution of the state. 2 At the same time, how-
ever, proceedings in juvenile court are held without
the paraphernalia of procedures used in criminal
trials to protect the rights of the individual, on the
grounds that use of these forms might be injurious
to a child.
Herein lies the peculiar paradox of juvenile courts:
designed to ensure a superior justice through protection
of the child, they have to an excessive extent aban-
doned the fundamentals upon which the methods of
promoting justice are based.13
The "peculiar paradox" arises from the indecision
of those concerned with the juvenile court as to
what its function should be. It arises from the
complexity of the source of modem thought which
9 TEETERS AD REINEmANN, op. cit., p. 281.
10 TAPPAN, op. cit., p. 169.





provides the justification for continued existence
of the juvenile court.
It has yet to be decided whether the juvenile
court is to be limited to the adjudication and
disposition of cases in which juvenile offenders
have broken the law, or whether it is to become
the central agency in the community for dealing
with the problems of children in society. In writing
of the accomplishments of the juvenile court, some
authors proudly point to the variety of com-
munity projects undertaken by the court, its
clinic to aid youngsters who have not been brought
before the court formally, and its probation officers
performing the tasks of "informal probation."' 4
Even juvenile court judges, who wish to retain the
court as a judicial body, have been known to ad-
vocate making the juvenile court, through its in-
take department or otherwise, a kind of "social
service exchange."1 5
Interwoven with this problem is the question of
how the disposition and treatment of cases ad-
judged delinquent by the court is to be carried out.
It is at this point that psychology and casework
are brought directly on the scene. Here the
principles governing the juvenile court become
blurred. It is here that the doubt and indecision as
to the nature of the court are most clearly to be
seen.' 6 The decision as to disposition, according to
statute, is supposed to be made primarily for the
welfare of the child; yet the decision is made by a
judge, untrained in the principles of child guid-
ance.' The child is to be treated, "in so far as
possible," as a child "in need of aid, encouragement
and guidance" (emphasis added); yet, in most
cases, the delinquent is placed in the care of a
14 GLENN R. WINTERS, Op. Cit.
A conversation with some probation officers and
a psychiatrist participating in the court clinic pro-
gram in the Boston area revealed the prevalence of
the attitude that it is the function of the court
clinic and the probation officers to handle informally
as many as possible of the cases that come to their
attention. One of the probation officers described to
the author how he placed children in foster homes,
by contacts with private agencies, in an informal
way and without court action. The psychiatrist
stated to me that it was his aim to give treatment to
as many children as possible without sending them
through a court proceeding. Apparently, the judge
of this particular court sanctioned these practices.
"5 LIBBY E. SAcnAR, A Judge's View of Juvenile Pro-
bation and Parole, N.P.P.A. YEARBOOK, 1952.
I All descriptions of procedure and discussion of the
way in which the juvenile court and related agencies
perform their functions are based upon the system
presently in use in Massachusetts, unless otherwise
stated.
17 MAss. ANNo. LAws, c. 119, sec. 53 (1956).
probation officer, who is responsible to the judge.
Thus, the judge is ultimately responsible for the
treatment of most delinquent children. The final
decisions as to the treatment of a delinquent child
therefore remain, as they were before the juvenile
court was founded, in the hands of a judge. He is
trained in the principles of law, to act in the
capacities of protector of the community and
guardian of individual rights against the claims of
the state; he is not a therapist or diagnostician.
Neither psychologist nor social caseworker par-
ticipates in taking the responsibility for these
decisions affecting the welfare of the child. The
judge, it is true, is furnished information by the
probation officer and in some cases by the psy-
chologist and the psychiatrist as well; but he is free
to disregard these reports. Responsibility, there-
fore, remains with the judge. The therapist and
social worker, representatives of the new sciences
which provide the rationale for the existence of the
juvenile court, must still take second place.
The fact that disposition and some forms of
treatment are left in the hands of the judge has
still further significance. For "in addition to re-
straint upon liberty, the methods of treatment and
training through court action are in fact partially
punitive." 8 Thus, it is a reasonable hypothesis
that the criminal origins of the juvenile court have
not been entirely forgotten by the community,
and that punishment, in and for itself, is still an
important element governing the juvenile court. It
is to be noted that the child himself usually feels
that he is brought before the court to be punished.19
Moreover, the fact that disposition, and often
treatment itself, is left in the hands of the judge
may serve to indicate that the punitive element in
the administration of justice is still, in practice, of
equal importance with the therapeutic aims which
find expression in the language of the statute.20
The fact that the juvenile court does not have
jurisdiction over children who commit offenses
punishable by death"l and that it may dismiss the
complaint of delinquency in the case of a child
over 14 so that he may be tried in the criminal
8 TA.P,, op. cit., p. 220.
'9 HELEN L. WITnER, Social Case Work in the Field
of Juvenile Probation, in PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROGRESS, N.P.P.A. YEARBOOK, 1941, p. 161. It is not
intended to convey the impression that punishment
can never have therapeutic value. The only point is
that the aims of the law, in the traditional sense, in
inflicting punishment, and those of the therapist, are of
a different nature.




court,n is further evidence that there is still a
punitive element in the law governing the juvenile
court. It is, in one aspect, regarded as the mildest
punishment-inflicting agency of the state; but a
punitive institution nevertheless. "Parens patriae"
and retributive punishment are still competing
with each other for supremacy in the juvenile court.
The paradox in the juvenile court is, then, that
treatment and therapy are, by the very nature of
the court as a court of law, based upon a judgment
of guilt or innocence; two different categories,
that of legal judgment in terms of moral and
ethical values, and that of therapeutic decision in
terms of sickness and health, are intermingled to
produce its decision. The change in terminology
from that of the criminal court's "guilt" or
"innocence" to that of "delinquency" or "non-
delinquency" has not altered the fact that the
court's adjudication of status is a social and moral
judgment rather than a psychological diagnosis;
calling the process of determining what to do with
the delinquent after adjudication "disposition"
rather than "sentencing" does not altogether
eliminate the punitive element.
It would be interesting to discover tle precise
reasons why it is so difficult to eliminate the
punitive element from the treatment of persons
who have committed anti-social acts.P Perhaps,
as Ruth Eissler suggests, it is connected with the
community need for a scape-goat on which to vent
the feelings of guilt which accompany the conscious
or unconscious anti-social impulses of the members
of society. Ruth Eissler speculates that the roots
of the difficulty may have other factors of equal
importance: she postulates that society really does
not wish to stamp out delinquent behavior, and
hence, it places obstacles in the way of developing
an adequate program for its eradication. The
reason for this reluctance, she maintains, is that
delinquent behavior serves as a vicarious acting-
out of the anti-social impulses of the law-abiding
portion of the population.u If Eissler and the other
psychoanalysts who have developed similar
hypotheses are correct, it is not difficult to see why
the element of punishment still remains a part of
the system for dealing with delinquency. This
22 Ibid., sec. 61.
For an interesting discussion of this point, see
RunH S. EIssLmR, Scapegoats of Society in SEAIcH-
LIGHTS ON DELINQUENCY (New York, 1949), p. 288,
following hypotheses developed from her clinical ob-
servations of interfamily relations. See also, the work
of ADELAImE M. JoHNsov, S. A. SzuREK and others.
21 RUTH S. ExssmFR, op. cit.
paper, then is concerned with the difficulties that
arise in attempting to combine the requirements of
the social order, both in psychological terms and in
terms of the requirements of due process of law,
with the therapeutic requirements of proper diag-
nosis and treatment to effect a cure of juvenile
delinquency.
A-II
The "peculiar paradox" of the juvenile court was
recognized soon after its establishment. The recog-
nition took the form of an inquiry into the compe-
tence of a judge trained in the law to determine the
proper therapy to be applied in the treatment of
those cases which he had adjudged delinquent. In
1917, Judge H. M. Baker wrote:
It has frequently been declared that the purposes of the
juvenile court are to prevent, not to punish; to reform,
not to chastise. Theoretically this is true, but prac-
tically it has too frequently been forgotten. The truth
is that the prevention of criminal tendencies in the
young... properly rest on other than legal consider-
ations.
Judge Baker, moreover, was of the opinion that
judges were not competent to pass on the "other
than legal considerations": ". . . I believe that each
man should stick to his trade, and that a mastery
of law is about all that can be expected of the
average individual...,aM
It was thought that the expert judgment neces-
sary to determine the form of treatment could be
provided by an adequate probation department
attached to the'court.H Another suggestion was to
provide an extensive referee system. Referees
would be appointed on the basis of their expert
knowledge of methods of dealing with delinquents.
The referees would hear the petitions of delin-
quency, make a finding of fact and recommenda-
tions for disposition which would he subject to the
approval of the judge.28 Ultimate responsibility for
disposition (and for treatment in the event that
the child was placed on probation) rested with the
judge alone.
Neither of these solutions considered the possi-
bility of altogether relieving the judge of his power
of disposition after adjudication of status. In the
25 
HERBERT M. BAKER, The Functions of the Juvenile
Court, 24 CASE & Coe. 449 (1917).
26 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 451; Mnua" VAN WATERs, The Socializa-
tion of Juvenile Court Procedure, 13 J. Cmu. L. &
CRnnN. 61 (1922).
2 Mnmi VAN WATERs, Ibid.
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late 1930's, however, with the publication of such
works as the Gluecks' study of the juvenile court
in Boston and its relevation of a discouragingly
high percentage of recidivism among delinquents
who came before the Boston court,29 and the study
of the plight of youthful offenders over juvenile
court age in New York City by Harrison and
Grant,30 serious discussion began over the ad-
visability of divorcing disposition and treatment
from adjudication of status.31
As a direct response to the study by Harrison
and Grant, supra, the American Law Institute
undertook to consider ways in which the process of
treatment determination might be separated from
the criminal trial of youthful offenders. The out-
come of its deliberations was the Model Youth
Correction Authority Act.n The Model Act was
intended for use in the sentencing and treatment of
youthful offenders who came before the criminal
court, and not for the disposition of cases before the
juvenile court. In all of the states where it has
been adopted, however, the Act has been used at
least in part to dispose of juvenile cases. In none
of these states has the Act been adopted as a
whole. 33 Massachusetts is one of the states which
has, with important modifications, adopted the
Youth Authority idea; but it has limited the scope
of the Authority (called the Youth Service Board)
to the handling of juvenile cases.H
In modifying the Model Act, Massachusetts has
left a limited discretion as to disposition after
judgment in the hands of the judge; similarly, it
has retained probation as a function of the court.35
The Massachusetts Act, therefore, bears little
resemblance in its structure to that which was en-
visioned by the drafters of the Model Code; it does
not achieve the "coordination and integration of
29 S. & E, T. GLUEcK, 1000 JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
(Cambridge, 1934).
30 LEONARD B. HARRISON AND PRYOR MCNEILL
GRANT, YouTa IN THE TOILS (New York, 1938).
3 See THOMSs D. ELIOT, Suppressed Premises Under-
lying the Glueck Controversy: Divorce Treatment from
Adjudication! 26 J. Cumi. L. & C imq. 22 (,935).
"ALI YoUrH CORRECTION AUTHORITY AcT: Official
Draft, June 22, 1940.
3For discussion of the Model Act and its fate in the
five jurisdictions in which it had been adopted by 1951,
see BERTRAM M. BECK, FvE STATES: A STUDY OF THE
YOUTH AUTHORITY PROGRAM AS PROMULGATED BY
THE ALI (Philadelphia, 1951).
3"MAss. ANNo. LAws, c. 6, secs. 65-69A, c. 120
(1955).
39 IVODEI. YOUTH CORRECTION AUTHORITY AcT,
Sec. 11; MAss. ANNO. LAWS, C. 119, sec. 58 and sec. 64,
as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 731, sec. 2; c. 276 as
amended by Acts of 1956, c. 731.
treatment processes" which was a part of the
original plan. 6 Nor does it substitute diagnosis and
prescription of treatment for judicial disposition.
Perhaps the explanation for the action of
Massachusetts iii thus emasculating the Youth
Authority Act is the reluctance of the legislature to
abandon totally the punitive aspect of the law in
relation to delinquency. But another element of
importance must be considered as well. The Model
Act was intended to function after trial in a
criminal court. In the criminal courts, the jury
trial and formal rules of evidence and procedure
are still maintained. The question of guilt or
innocence is often in dispute, and guilt must be
proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, even if the power of disposition after
trial is taken from the court, it still has important
powers and duties.
In the juvenile court, on the other hand,- formal
procedures are not strictly followed. Moreover,
most of the defendants readily admit that they
have committed the acts with which they have
been charged.N7 Therefore, if the power of dis-
position were taken from the juvenile court judge,
he would be left with merely formal functions in
most cases in which a delinquency was charged. It
may be that the legislature felt it inadvisable to
restrict the juvenile court to such an extent.30
Closely connected with the question of whether
the judge should retain discretion as to disposition
is the problem posed by keeping probation as an
arm of the court. In the present Massachusetts
system, probation is the mainstay of the juvenile
court. It is through the probation department of
the court that the judge learns about the child's
background. The probation officer recommends to
the judge the form that treatment should take.
Moreover, in most cases, the probation officer wil
administer the treatment as well; far more juvenile
cases are disposed of through probation than in
any other way, except for dismissal and filing.' 9
" BECK, op. cit., p. 4.
7This fact was brought out by Professor Glueck in
a Seminar on Problems of Juvenile Delinquency at
Harvard Law School, Fall Term, 1956.
"8 Throughout this paper, the discussion of the ju-
venile court relates only to its delinquency jurisdiction.
Its neglect and dependency jurisdiction is not discussed.
As will appear later in this paper, the writer does not
feel, in spite of the opinion of many social workers and
the position taken in the Standard Juvenile Court Act
of the N.P.P.A., that delinquency cases should be
treated in precisely the same way as neglect and de-
pendency cases.
"I have been able to find no statistics later than
those in TEETERS AND REINEmANN, op. cit., p. 332,
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The argument of Tappan against unofficial proba-
tion might be applied as well to all juvenile
probation: ". . . unofficial probation... full grown
... threatens to dwarf the judicial process.... .,40
Several writers have recommended detaching
probation from the juvenile court. In its place,
they would include the functions of probation
among those of a state-side administrative agency
for treating all cases from the juvenile courts.
I am persuaded ... that... probation... will not
always be contented with the role of advisory service to
our courts; that the day is not far distant when proba-
tion will be independently organized and administered
with the same dignity, initiative and independence that
our hospital systems now enjoy.41
In the same way that the role of the juvenile court
in society remains ambiguous, the position of
probation vis-a-vis the court is unclear. It has
already been noted that some probation officers
consider informal probation one of their most
important tasks2
The statute providing for probation in the
juvenile court sets out two specific tasks for the
probation officer.4 The first is an investigation of
the background of each child adjudged delinquent;
the second, supervision of children placed on pro-
bation. In addition, the probation officer is required
to be present at the trial of the delinquent. He is
required to report to the judge on the results of his
investigation. The report must contain information
as to the child's character, his school record, home
surroundings, and previous complaints against the
child. But other than providing a rather meagre
outline of the officer's task, the statute is of little
help in defining what the probation officer is to do.
It does not specify the methods he is to use in his
investigations, nor does it describe his duties of
supervision. Therefore, there is room for each
court and each probation officer to define their own
concept of the probation job.
In his dealings with children placed on proba-
Table of Dispositions. This is a general nationwide
survey, and it probably does not reflect the true situa-
tion in Massachusetts today. However, conversations
with probation officers, members of the staff at the
Judge Baker Clinic and psychiatrists attached to the
District Courts, as well as with a representative of the
Youth Service Board indicate the truth of the statement
in the text.
40 TAPAN, op. cit., p. 203.
41 
SAu'roD BATES, The Next Hundred Years, in
PROBATION AND PAROLE PROGRESS, N.P.P.A. YEAR-
BOOK, 1941, pp. 83-84.
42 See footnote 14, p. 5
MASS. ANxo. LAws, c. 119, sec. 57.
tion, the probation officer may assume two roles:
one is that of a supervisor, who is there simply to
see that the boy complies with the terms of his
probation. The other is a quasi-therapeutic role, in
which the probation officer acts as the child's
"Friend" in his contacts with him. The latter role,
however, carries with it inherent difficulties, in that
the child must realize that his "Friend" will report
him to the judge if he misbehaves; he may ask
himself, therefore, whether the probation officer is
in reality a very good friend."
He (the probation officer) can only be what he is-a
representative of the state, employed both to give aid
and counsel to each delinquent with regard to elimin-
nating or avoiding the situations productive of delin-
quency and to keep the court informed about the
delinquent's progress in this endeavor. 5
Here again, the therapeutic aims of the court
system are confronted with its punitive aspect.
Social workers such as Witmer feel that these two
elements cannot really be reconciled in the same
system. Wollan, in his description of the Citizen-
ship Training Group program in Boston, mentions
that the CTG must be divorced both from probk-
tion and from the court, and that it cannot have
any punitive tasks. In the CTG system, all mat-
ters such as violations of attendance are referred to
the probation officer for disposition." Cantor, too,
believes that the probation officer should limit
himself in his functions to those of a "psycho-
logical policeman."47
From the point of view of the legal system as well
as for the therapeutic considerations mentioned
above, it would be desirable to clarify the role of
the probation system in the treatment of de-
linquency, and perhaps, to consider its abolition as
a separate entity altogether. It has already been
shown that this recommendation has been put
forth by several writers. The problem, however, is
so inextricably tied up with the question of the
extent to which the judge should have discretion in
determining the form treatment, that it is dif-
ficult to discuss the one without the other.
44 HEI N L. WrNmR, op. cit., pp. 165-66.
5 Ibid.46 KENETH G. WoLLAN, The Citizenship Training
Program of the Boston Juvenile Court, in PROBATION
AND PAROr PROGRESS, supra, p. 385. Compare also,
FRITz REDL AND DAVID WINEmAN, CHILDREN WHO
HATE, (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), pp. 236-37, for a descrip-
tion of role distribution in the Pioneer House project.
There, too, it was felt imperative to separate discipline
from therapy.
4
7 NATHANIEL CANTOR, The Function of Probation,




The statutory definition of delinquency is of
crucial importance in discussing the scope of the
court's jurisdiction. It is of great significance as
well in discussion of the court's role as a judicial
body. The definition will determine whether the
court is to act in the capacity of an agency de-
signed to prevent anti-social behavior prior to an
infraction of the legal code, or whether, as a court
of law, it is to limit itself to those cases where there
has been such an infraction.
Probably, the early founders of the juvenile
court movement were not concerned so much with
the prevention of delinquency as with the treat-
ment of young offenders; it was a movement that
had as its first aim the amelioration of the treat-
ment afforded convicted offenders, rather than the
prevention of crime.48 A secondary purpose was,
however, to prevent crime, by transforming young
offenders into good citizens. The movement was so
closely connected to "child saving" in general that
it is difficult in the early stages to distinguish the
motivations of the founders regarding delinquency
from the efforts to help neglected and dependent
children.49 For the purposes of this paper, it is
important only that the movement was concerned
specifically with the welfare of children, rather than
with the protection of the community from youth-
ful anti-social behavior. But today, both because
of the existence of the juvenile court and because of
the supposed prevalence of juvenile crime, those
concerned with the juvenile court are increasingly
interested in finding ways of protecting the com-
munity from the depredations of anti-social
children. One reason for the growth of this interest
may be the accusation that the court "molly-
coddles" juvenile offenders. The recognition that
many children who are not brought into court may
nevertheless be either potential or actual menaces
is an added factor in placing a considerable burden
of prevention activity on the court.
The Massachusetts statute is so drawn that it
can be used to impose treatment prior to the com-
mission of a delinquent act. Delinquency itself is
defined as the commission of an act in violation of
the law and not punishable by death by a child
under the age of seventeen. However, a child may
be charged with "waywardness," and thus be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the court without
48 See Part A-I.
9 TEETERS AND REiNEMANN, op. cit., pp. 41-43.
having committed an unlawful act. A "wayward
child" is
a child between seven and seventeen years of age who
habitually associates with vicious or immoral persons,
or who is growing up in circumstances exposing him to
lead an immoral, vicious or criminal life. 0
A distinction is drawn between the treatment that
is to be afforded a wayward child and that given a
delinquent. A delinquent child may be committed
to the Youth Service Board under the broad
powers given to that body in regulating the liberty
of a delinquent. A wayward child, however, may
be dealt with by the Youth Service Board only
in the same way as a neglected child is treated by
the Department of Welfare.51 A child who has not
violated the law is not subject to the same treat-
ment as one who, but for the special laws concern-
ing anti-social children, would be a criminal.
Nevertheless, the court is given jurisdiction over
a child before he has violated the law. Thus, it
enters into an area which, according to some
writers, should be reserved for other agencies.
We must face realistically the inherent limitations of
a legal process which is designed to enforce specific
rules through their breach. The law may not...
impose anticipatory control upon the individual who
has not yet offended against it .... It cannot without
grave injustices prevent the first offense through ef-
forts of personality diagnosis and treatment. 2
Another writer has objected to allowing the court
to impose "anticipatory controls" on the basis that
scientific knowledge is not so accurate as to allow
reliable prediction of future behavior. Therefore, he
argues, it is unjust to impose such controls, because
the child may never commit a violation of law.w
Thus, disposition (and especially confinement)
should depend in part upon the "gravity of the
misconduct which brought the child before the
court."' ' Further, the same writer asserts, in
practice, commitments are frequently made to
meet the requirements of "justice," rather than
"treatment.'5 5 Insofar as the objection is based
50 MASS. ANNo. LAws, c. 119, sec. 52.
51 MAss. AiNeo. LAws, c. 119, sec. 58.
"PAUL W. TAPPAN, The Adolescent in Court, 37 J.
CRIX. L. & CRDIIN. 216, 227-228 (1946).
"DAVID BOGEN, 'Justice versus Individualized Treat-
ment in the Juvenile Court,' 35 J. Caim. L. & CRIIN.
249, 251 (1944).
'4Ibi4.
55 ,,... Thus we find that in practice the more severe
types of treatment are resorted to only in cases where
the child has committed an offense sufficient to justify
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upon the inadequacy of predictive tools, re-
searches of the Gluecks and their development of
the Glueck prediction tables may reduce its force. 56
The basic legal problem, however, will remain
linsolved. The possibility of accurately predicting
anti-social behavior will not supply a standard for
invocation of the court's jurisdiction. In the case
of any child before the court, it will still be neces-
sary to determine whether the probability that he
will become a danger to society is great enough to
justify interference by the state with his liberty.
If the court were designed to protect all children,
exercise of its powers without reliance upon well-
defined standards would not pose such a difficult
problem. However, the court was not established
for such a broad purpose. It is limited to providing
care only to those children in need of it. A child has
the right not be become a ward of the state. In the
case of delinquency, there is the possibility, at the
very least, that the child may feel the conse-
quences of being placed under the care of the
state as unpleasant. A child who is not a danger to
society has a right not to be subjected to un-
pleasant treatment by the community. Therefore,
scientific advances will not obviate the necessity
for adherence to proper standards in invoking the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Only by adhering
to legal norms can the rights of all children to their
freedom be protected.
A-IV
This paper has analyzed the problems of de-
linquency control from the standpoint of the social
institutions necessary to combat youthful anti-
social behavior. It has not been concerned with
substantive methods of treatment. It must be
noted, however, that to a certain extent the prob-
lems of organization depend upon the form
that treatment takes. If it is recognized that
expert knowledge is necessary to determine how a
delinquent can be cured, then the state should
provide for its application to every case. If expert
skill is required to carry out the treatment itself,
the state must provide the necessary trained per-
sonnel. It must also develop a procedure through
which their skill can be applied.
If places of confinement are in reality prisons,
such a serious move. In other words, the juvenile court
theoretically renounces the idea of dealing with the
child on the basis of the offense but yet turns to the
essential principle of "justice" when it comes to an
important decision." Ibid.
51 S. and E. T. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY (Cambridge, 1950).
the only criterion for commitment should be the
magnitude of the offense. If, however, they are
treatment centers designed to cure sick children
and to protect the community, the standards for
commitment should be based on clinical diagnosis
and the weighing of the rights of the child against
the danger his actions present to the community.
It has already been stated that the development
of scientific methods of prediction will not elimin-
ate the necessity for judicial decision. As Professor
Sheldon Glueck has pointed out to the writer, a
sick person has a right not to be treated; it is only
when he becomes contagious that he may be
quarantined. The same principle of social pro-
tection must be applied to the treatment of de-
linquent children.
PART B
In the following pages, a proposal is set forth
embodying a suggested solution to some of the
problems presented in this paper. The proposal is
in the form of a statute with comments appended
to each section. Because of limitations of space, the
statute and the comments have been abbreviated.
More detailed commentary may be obtained by
communication with the author. The statute is
concerned exclusively with the delinquency
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. It does not enter
into a discussion of dependency or neglect; nor does
it deal with the problems raised by "defective
delinquents" and other children whose behavior is
described in recognized categories of mental
disease. The reason for omitting discussion of these
aspects of the court's jurisdiction is the author's
opinion that the function of the juvenile court in
delinquency is in large part determined by the fact
that the community must be protected from anti-
social behavior. In this sense, the juvenile court in
its delinquency aspect is similar to the criminal
courts. Even under ideal conditions, therefore, the
child and the community look upon the court, at
least in part, as an agency of punishment. This
orientation of the delinquency jurisdiction of the
court, therefore, raises problems of a different
nature than those of the neglect and dependency
jurisdiction.
The proposal was drawn for the purpose of pro-
viding a system in which the outcome of each case
would be conditioned by considerations both of a
legal and of a clinical nature. Under the present
Massachusetts system, the lawyer, expert in the
evaluation of only one of these considerations, is
alone responsible for disposition. Under a Youth
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Authority program, the judgment of the expert
administrator prevails. The special skill of the
administrator extends only to an evaluation of
clinical data and the application of treatment
necessary to cure the disease. The expert is not
trained in the delicate process of balancing the
rights of the individual against the demands of the
community. The training of the lawyer and the
insights of the clinician are equally necessary in
arriving at a disposition. Therefore, a system is
needed under which the results of evaluation in
each case will be the integrated expression of all
the values that strive for recognition in the con-
cept of the juvenile court.
B-I
PROPOSAL FOR A PLAN RELATING TO THE CONTROL
OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
I. Definitions
1. "Delinquent child" and "Wayward child"
A. A Delinquent child is a child between the
ages of seven and seventeen who violates
any city ordinance or town by-law or com-
mits any offense against the laws of the
commonwealth, and who is adjudged to be
in need of:
a. treatment or supervision in order to pre-
vent further outbreaks of illegal and anti-
social behavior, or
b. confinement, in order to protect himself
or the community.
B. A Wayward child is a child between the
ages of seven and seventeen who:
a. has engaged in a consistent pattern of
serious anti-social behavior, (but has not
violated any city ordinance or town by-
law and has not committed any offense
against the laws of the Commonwealth),
and
b. is in immediate danger of becoming a
Delinquent child, or a criminal, unless he
is subjected to preventive treatment, and
c. is in need of, and will more proably than
not benefit by, treatment or supervision
without confinement.
Comment: Compare Mass. Anno. Laws, c. 119, sec.
52. The definition of "delinquent child" has been
expanded so as to include children charged with
capital crimes. Also, provision is made to permit
the finding that a child has performed a delinquent
act, but is not a delinquent child. If a finding is
made that a child has performed a delinquent act,
but that it is not necessary either for his own
welfare or for the welfare of the community to
subject him to further state control, the child will
not be found delinquent.
The definition of "wayward child" has been
narrowed to provide a standard that is less vague
than that in the present statute in Massachusetts.
Compare Mass. Anno. Laws, c. 119, sec. 52. The
section is intended to deal with those cases which
appear to require attention by the state, but in
which there has been no technical violation of law.
It is to be noted that only supervisory, and not
confinement, techniques may be used on children
found to be "wayward."
II. Delinquency Control Areas
1. There shall be [X1 Delinquency control Areas in
the Commonwealth.
[2. Establishment in each Area of a Court for the
Diposition of Juvenile Cases, a Juvenile Court,
and a Facility of the Youth Service Board.]
Comment: This section establishes a regional
system under a state-wide plan of organization to
deal with problems of delinquency control. In
each regional area, there is a complete set of in-
stitutions, including the regional courts which are
provided for in later sections, and a regional
office of the Youth Service Board.
III. The Juvenile Court
1. There shall be one Juvenile Court for each
Delinquency Control Area in the Common-
wealth.
2. Composition of the Juvenile Court; qualifica-
tions of the judge.
A. The court shall consist of a judge, a clerk of
the court, a court stenographer, and such
administrative personnel as are required to
keep the records of the court.
B. The judge shall be a lawyer and a member
of the Bar of the Supreme Judicial Court of
the Commonwealth, and shall have en-
gaged in the practice of law in the Com-
monwealth for [XI years.
[3. Powers, Duties, and Procedures. See Section
VIII, subsection 1 below.]
4. Jurisdiction.
A. The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction
over all cases in which there is a petition of
neglect or dependency in the case of a child
under seventeen years of age. 7
7 Since this paper is devoted to the delinquency
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, for the reasons al-
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B. The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction
over all cases in which there is a petition of
delinquency or waywardness, and to render
decisions as hereinafter provided.
C. The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction
over adults in cases in which contribution
to delinquency, waywardness, neglect or
dependency is charged.58
D. The juvenile court shall be a court of record
of the Commonwealth.
5. Appointment of Judges to the Juvenile Courts;
terms of office.
A. Judges of the juvenile courts shall be ap-
pointed by the Governor, upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Juvenile Court
Judges.
The first appointments to the juvenile
courts shall, however, be made by the
Governor upon the recommendation of the
Commissioners of Probation, Mental Health,
Welfare and Corrections, the judge of the
presently existing juvenile court of the
City of Boston, the Youth Service Board
and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court.
[B. Term of Judge. Provision for an extended
term of office for judge.]
6. Referees.
The judge of each court may appoint such
referees as necessary to hear petitions coming
before the court and to make findings, subject to
the disapproval of the judge.
Comment: The main feature of this section is that
it establishes a state-wide juvenile court system, as
a substitute for the juvenile-sessions system now
used in Massachusetts outside of the city of
Boston. Since the courts are established on a
regional basis, rather than one for each political
subdivision of the state, it is thought that the plan
would be feasible from a financial point of view.
It is to be noted that no provision is made for a
probation service attached to the court. The proba-
tion function is to be performed by the regional
office of the Youth Service Board.
Formal qualifications for the position of juvenile
court judge have been limited to legal education
ready discussed, there will be no further mention of the
neglect and dependency jurisdiction of the court.
53 It has been thought desirable to retain the juris-
diction over adults of the juvenile court, since fre-
quently, it is necessary to treat the parents in order to
effect a cure of the child. However, this is a question
that the writer has not explored fully, and therefore,
there will be no further discussion of it in this paper.
and experience. Until it becomes possible to de-
velop a separate profession of juvenile court
judge, as suggested by Sheldon Glueck, 59 it seems
advisable to limit the statutory standards to those
stated in this section. Moreover, subsection 5,
paragraph A, provides a method through which
men qualified to act as juvenile court judges may
be chosen.
IV. The Board of Juvenile Court Judges
[Sections 1 and 2 establish the Board of Juvenile
Court judges, and provide that it shall be com-
posed of the judges of all the Juvenile Courts of
the state.]
3. The Board shall meet from time to time to
discuss problems affecting the Juvenile Courts
of the Commonwealth.
Upon the occurrence of any vacancy in any
Juvenile Court, the Board shall present to the
Governor a recommendation or recommendations
as to candidates to fill the vacated office.
V. The Court far the Disposition of Juvenile Cases
1. There shall be a Court for the Disposition of
Juvenile Cases (hereinafter known as the
Court) in each Delinquency Control Area
of the Commonwealth.
2. Composition.
A. Each Court shall be composed of a Chief
Judge and two Special Judges.
(i) The Chief Judge shall be the Judge of
the Juvenile Court of the Delinquency
Control Area.
(ii) The Special Judges shall be experts in
the diagnosis and treatment of delin-
quent children.
B. The Special Judges shall be chosen on the
basis of their experience and training in the
treatment and diagnosis of delinquent
children.
(i) One Special Judge of each Court shall
have received the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy or the equivalent thereof,
in clinical psychology, from an ac-
credited university, and shall have had
at least [X] years of experience in the
treatment of juvenile delinquency.
(ii) One Special Judge of each Court shall
have received a degree of Master of
5'SHELDON GLU]ECE, The Sentencing Problem, Ad-
dress delivered at the Judicial Conference of the
Third Circuit, United States Courts, at Atlantic City,
N. J., September 12, 1956.
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Arts or Sciences, or the equivalent
thereof, in sociology, psychology, or
social work, from an accredited uni-
versity, and shall have had [X] years of
experience in social casework with
juvenile delinquents.
3. Jurisdiction.
A. The Court shall have jurisdiction over all
cases arising in its Areas in which a petition
of delinquency or waywardness has been
filed, and in which the judge of the Juvenile
Court has made a finding:
(i) in the case of a petition of delinquency,
that the child has committed a violation
of law, as described in Section I, sub-
section A;
(ii) in the case of a petition of waywardness
or delinquency that the child has en-
gaged in a consistent pattern of serious
anti-social behavior.
B. The Court shall have jurisdiction as a court
of first instance over all cases arising in its
Area in which it is alleged that the Youth
Service Board has abused its powers.
In all such cases, however, the Chief Judge
alone shall render the decision of the Court;
the Special Judges shall, however, advise
the Chief Judge in those aspects of such
cases which concern methods of treatment of
delinquents and wayward children.
C. In all other cases, decisions of the Court
shall be rendered by the Chief Judge with
the concurrence of at least one of the Special
Judges.
4. Powers, Duties, Procedures.-[See Section
VII subsection 2, below.]
5. Appointment of the Special Judges.
The special judges of each Court shall be
appointed by the Governor, upon the recom-
mendation of the Youth Service Board and the
Commissioner of Mental Health.
Connient: The dispositions court is the central
feature of this plan which distinguishes it from
other proposals which have been made for post-
adjudication procedure in determining the form
that treatment is to take. It differs from the
present plan in effect in Massachusetts in that it
divests the judge of the juvenile court, sitting
alone, of independent responsibility for disposi-
tion; it differs from the Model Youth Correction
Authority Act and similar proposals in that it
leaves the power of disposition in a judicial body,
and gives the juvenile court judge a voice in de-
termining disposition. The author is unaware of
any other plan which provides for a sharing of
ultimate responsibility by the court and the
experts in determining the crucial question of what
disposition will be made of a case that is before
the juvenile court.
The proposal results from a consideration of the
dilemma posed by the dispositions problem. On
the one hand, it seems undesirable to leave ulti-
mate responsibility for disposition in the hands of
a lawyer-judge, who by training and often by
temperament is not suited to make a decision that
is in part a choice between therapeutic methods.
On the other hand, since severe restraints upon the
liberty of the individual may be imposed, it is
equally unsatisfactory to place the dispositions
function in an administrative body composed
solely of experts on clinical method. The argu-
ments of Bogen and Tappan concerning the un-
desirability of imposing what Tappan calls
"anticipatory controls" upon an individual are
relevant here as well.6 0 The underlying premise is
the same: the interest of the individual to have the
state not interfere in his life is the kind of interest
that ought to be given the greatest possible pro-
tection.
Because both therapeutic and legal principles
are integral parts of each decision as to disposi-
tion, provision should be made for their direct
expression in the body that performs the dis-
position function. Therefore, even a system in
which the judge makes his decision upon the
recommendation of experts is unsatisfactory, for
two reasons: First, the judge acting entirely upon
the experts' recommendations, is little more than
a puppet; the prestige and meaning of the court as
a court of law stand in danger of becoming entirely
submerged. On the other hand, the judge left free
to decide by himself the best course of treatment to
be followed, may act on a relatively uninformed
basis. The dispositions court is suggested to pro
vide a forum in which the lawyer and the expert
can discuss each case and take joint responsibilit%
for the results of their deliberations. Further, it
provides an opportunity for expert and judge to
work out together a policy of disposition to be
followed, in different classes of cases. Individuali-
zation of justice and the legal requirement of
adherence to precedent may thus, to a certain
extent, be reconciled.
The dispositions plan is a way to stave off the
6" See page 18, ante.
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abdication of the judges in determining what form
treatment will take.
The wise judge does not surrender the judging process
to the specialist... It is his domain to pass their con-
tributions through the alembic of his mind and distil
them into a workable program that takes account of
legal demands and social limitations, as well as clinical
findings."1
In this body, the judge will still bear the burden of
responsibility for taking into account "legal de-
mands and social limitations"; the specialist will
interpret the clinical findings. Each will con-
tribute his own point of view; individual rights,
community demands and clinical requirements
will. of necessity, be considered in every dis-
position made by this court.
The proposal is unorthodox in that it provides
for laymen to sit as judges in a court of law. This
practice is seldom followed in the United States;
there is, however, a precedent in the English
practice of using lay magistrates extensively
(sitting, incidentally, without a lawyer to share the
bench with them) to hear and dispose of cases
involving juvenile offenders.
The plan is similar to the proposal of Professor
Sheldon Glueck that judges of criminal courts sit
on parole boards, in that it serves to acquaint the
judge, through direct participation in their deliber-
ations, with the considerations that enter into the
decisions of experts in deciding how to treat
offenders.
More study and thought are necessary to de-
termine what the qualifications of the Special
Judges should be. The standards proposed in sub-
section 2B are thought to contain minimum
educational requirements; however, it is possible
that the fields of study designated as prerequisites
for the office are not the most relevant ones.
Considerable experience in practical work with
anti-social children is, of course, essential.
The procedure of subsection 3B has been sug-
gested because of the desire to emphasize the con-
siderations that should govern the court's decision,
and because it is felt that such cases will be
directly concerned with questions of infringement
of personal liberty. In such cases, the legal point
"SHELDON & ELAoa GLUECK, 1000 JUVENILE
DELINQUENSS, (Cambridge, 1934), p. 114.
6' It has also come to my attention recently that in
the Federal Republic of Germany the juvenile court of
each district is composed of four unpaid lay magistrates
who sit together with a stipendiary, lawyer-magistrate
to decide upon juvenile cases. GORDON ADLa.x (1956)
Cptm. L. REv. 401 (June 1956).
of view should be predominate. The reason that
this jurisdiction is placed in the dispositions court
rather than in the juvenile court is to
remind the lawyer to consider the clinical
necessities of the case. The adversary nature
of our court system is thereby tempered, as
it is in all juvenile courts. Although the Youth
Service Board will have an opportunity to defend
its actions, the presence of clinicians in the court
will tend to create the understanding and co-
ordination necessary to the proper functioning of
the system.
The Youth Service Board has been made re-
sponsible for recommending to the Governor per-
sons to act as Special Judges. It is hoped that this
plan will serve to bring personnel of the Youth
Service Board into the court system, and thereby
provide a means of advancement for social workers,
psychologists and others employed by the Board.
It is also hoped that this method of selection will
bring about a degree of cooperation between court
and agency.
VI. The Caurt of Juvenile Appeals
1. There shall be a Court of Juvenile Appeals to
hear all cases appealed from the Juvenile Court
and the Court for the Disposition of Juvenile
Cases.
2. The Court of Juvenile Appeals shall be com-
posed of the members of the Board of Juvenile
Court Judges.
3. The Chief Justice shall be the Judge of the
Juvenile Court of the Boston (Metropolitan)
Delinquency Control Area.
4. Appeals from the decisions of the Court of
Juvenile Appeals shall be made directly to the
Supreme Judicial Court, according to thd rules
of that Court.
- 5. The Judge of the Juvenile Court of the De-
linquency Control Area in which a case on
appeal originated shall not participate in the
deliverations of the Court of Juvenile Appeals
concerning such a case.
Comment: ... By providing for an appeal on the
issue of treatment ... the law stultifies that
tribunal which.., is best qualified to pass on
treatment matters.
The specialized appellate court is suggested to
eliminate the difficulties arising from juvenile
appeals in the ordinary court system."4
6S. & E. T. GLUECK, op. cit., p. 24.
"The system of appeals in effect at present in
Massachusetts is of such a nature that if it were used
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VII. The Youth Service Board
1. Except as otherwise provided herein, and except
as inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
Chapter 6, Sections 65 through 69A, and
Chapter 120 of the General Laws of Massa-
chusetts, are hereby incorporated into this Act.
2. The powers and functions of the Youth Service
Board are hereby extended to include:
A. Those functions formerly performed by the
office of probation in juvenile cases, and
B. Those functions formerly performed by
clinics attached to the District Courts of
the Commonwealth in juvenile cases, and
C. Such other powers and functions as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
D. If a delinquent child has been committed to
the custody of the Facility or its Delegate
without confinement, as hereinafter pro-
vided, and the Director of the Facility or his
Delegate deems it necessary for the safety of
the child or of the community, the Director
may:
a. without notice to either the Juvenile
Court or to the Court for the Disposition
of Juvenile Cases, place the child in
detention for a period not to exceed
[X] hours, and
b. if the Director deems it necessary to
place the child in confinement for a
longer period of time, he shall apply to
the Juvenile Court for an order changing
the status of the child from that of treat-
ment or supervision (as defined in Section
I, subsection 2, A & B) to that of con-
finement (as defined in Section I, sub-
section 2, C).
Such an order of the Juvenile Court
shall be subject to disapproval upon con-
sideration by the Court for the Dis-
position of Juvenile Cases, under Section
V, subsection 3, C.
extensively it could destroy the juvenile court alto-
gether. The trial on appeal is in the Superior Court;
in effect, it is a proceeding de novo. If the appellant so
desires, he may have a jury trial, since the case is to
be determined as in a criminal trial. MASS. ANNo.
LAWS, C. 119, sec. 56. The study by Alper of appeals
from the Boston Juvenile Court from 1930-1935
demonstrates the damage that the juvenile court sys-
tem can suffer from such an appeals system. B. S.
ALPER, JuVENILE JuSTicE-A STUDY oF JUvENILE
APPEALS TO SUF OLK SUPERIOR COURT, BOSTON, 1930-
1935, 28 J. CR-m. L. & Ciu~m. 340 (1937). The idea
of a separate court to hear juvenile appeals is not
original with the author; although I am unable to give
citations, other writers have made similar proposals.
E. Section 6 of Chapter 120 of the General
Laws is hereby repealed.
3. The Youth Service Board shall establish a
Youth Service Board Facility (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Facility) in each Delinquency
Control Area.
A. The Facility shall include a detention center,
and
B. Such other buildings and equipment as are
necessary to enable it to conduct studies and
administer programs of treatment, super-
vision and prevention of delinquency in the
Area.
4. There shall be an Area Director of each Facility,
and such other appropriately trained personnel
as necessary shall be employed by the Youth
Service Board in each Facility to carry out
the functions provided for in this Act.
Comment: The purpose of this section is to inte-
grate all forms of treating anti-social children.
The new service will retain the functions of the
present Youth Service Board; in addition, it will
undertake the tasks now performed by the pro-
bation office. The Youth Service Board is in-
tended to be separate from the court system, but
integrated with it. The personnel and study centers
of the Board are to aid the courts in reaching
decisions as to the disposition of cases involving
delinquency and waywardness.
VIII. Proceedings before the Juvenile Court and the
Court for the Disposition of Juvenile Cases
1. Proceedings before the juvenile court.
A. Upon a child being brought before the
juvenile court on a petition of delinquency or
waywardness, a hearing shall be held before
the judge of the juvenile court, in the pres-
ence of the child and his parent or guardian.
a. If the child has no parent or legal
guardian, the juvenile court shall appoint
a guardian for the purposes of the pro-
ceedings.
b. A representative of the Facility of the
Youth Service Board of the Delinquency
Control Area shall be present at all pro-
ceedings before the juvenile court.
B. If the petition complains of delinquency or
waywardness, the juvenile court shall de-
termine:
a. Whether the child has committed the act
complained of, and
b. Whether, if it is determined that the
child has committed the act complained
of, the act constitutes a violation of any
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city ordinance, town by-law or offense
against the laws of the Commonwealth,
or
c. Whether the child has engaged in a con-
sistent pattern of serious anti-social be-
havior.
C. Upon the determination of the juvenile court
that a child has committed a violation of law
as provided in subsection B. paragraphs a
and b, the judge shall make a preliminary
finding of probable cause for an adjudication
of delinquency.
a. The judge shall thereupon continue the
case for a period of not less than [XJ
days and not more than [XI days.
b. The judge shall thereupon place the
child in the custody of a representative
of the Youth Service Board Facility of
the Delinquency Control Area.
(i) During the continuance, the Area
Facility shall undertake such study
as may be necessary to determine
final disposition of the case, and
(ii) Write a report containing the results
of the study and recommendations
for disposition. Such report shall be
forwarded to the Court for the Dis-
position of juvenile Cases.
c. If the juvenile court has reason to believe
that the safety of the community de-
mands that the child be placed in de-
tention during the continuance, it may of
its own motion order confinement of the
child by the Facility of the Youth Service
Board.
d. If the representative of the Youth Service
Board has reason to believe that the
welfare of the community or of the child
demands confinement of the child during
continuance, the representative may
make a motion that the juvenile court
order the confinement of the child for
the period of the continuance.
Unless the juvenile court finds that
the motion of the representative is not
made with a reasonable belief that con-
finement during continuance is necessary
for the welfare of the child or of the
community, it shall grant the motion
and issue the order of confinement.
D. Upon the determination of the juvenile
court that the child has engaged in a con-
sistent pattern of serious anti-social be-
havior as provided in subsection B, para-
graph c, the judge shall make a preliminary
finding of probable cause for an adjudication
of waywardness.
a. The judge shall thereupon continue the
case for a period of not less than [X]
days and not more than [X] days.
b. The court shall thereupon place the child
in the custody of a representative of the
Youth Service Board Facility of the
Delinquency Control Area.
(i) During the continuance, the Area
Facility shall undertake such study
as may be necessary to determine
final disposition of the case, and
(ii) Write a report containing the re-
sults of the study and recommenda-
tions for disposition. Such report
shall be forwarded to the Court for
the Disposition of Juvenile Cases.
Comment: The purpose of this subsection is to set
forth a procedure by which the judge may find the
facts and, the applicable law in cases of delinquency
and waywardness. The juvenile court has then
performed its function. Every case must be con-
tinued to provide an opportunity for the kind of
study that the specialists deem necessary to arrive
at an intelligent conclusion as to what should be
done with the child. There is also a provision, in the
case of children who have been charged with a
violation of law, for the application of necessary
restraints. There is no such provision in the case of
wayward children. Again, this reflects the phil-
osophy that a differentiation in treatment on the
basis of "behavior circumstance," as some writers
have called it, should properly be made in a legal
proceeding.
2. Proceedings before the Court for the Disposition
of juvenile Cases.
A. Upon termination of the continuance, the
case of a child in which the juvenile court
has made a preliminary finding of probable
cause for adjudication of delinquency or
waywardness shall be brought before the
court for the disposition of juvenile cases
(for purposes of this subsection, referred to
as the "Court").
B. If the juvenile court has made a preliminary
finding of probable cause for adjudication of
waywardness:
(i) the Court shall determine whether the
child:
a. is in immediate danger of becoming
a Delinquent child, or a criminal,
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unless he is subjected to preventive
treatment, and
b. is in need of, and will more probably
than not benefit by, treatment or
supervision without confinement.
(ii) If the Court has found in the affirmative
as to subparagraph (i) above, it shall
adjudge the child Wayward, and re-
mand him to the Youth Service Board
Facility for treatment or supervision
without confinement for such period, not
to exceed two years, as the Facility
deems necessary.
C. If the juvenile court has made a preliminary
finding of probable cause for adjudication of
delinquency:
(i) the Court shall determine whether the
child is in need of treatment, super-
vision or confinement;
(ii) if the Court determines that the child
is in need of treatment, supervision
or confinement, it shall adjudge the
child Delinquent.
(iii) The judgment of delinquency shall
state that:
a. the child is in need of treatment or
supervision, or
b. the child is in need of confinement.
(iv) The Court shall remand the Delinquent
to the custody of the Director of the
Youth Service Board Facility or his
representative, for such period as it
deems necessary, or until the child
shall have attained his 23rd birthday.
'The order of remand shall state that:
a. the child is to be confined, or
b. the child is to remain at liberty,
under treatment or supervision, in
the discretion of the Director of the
Youth Service Board Facility.
1. In the case of a child remanded
with the direction that he is to
remain at liberty, if thereafter it
becomes necessary for the safety
of the child or of the community,
the Director of the Facility or his
representative may, without ob-
taining an order from any court,
confine the child in its detention
home for a period not to exceed
[X] hours.
2. If the Director of the Facility
deems it necessary to retain the
child in confinement thereafter, it
shall apply to the juvenile court
for an interim order of confine-
ment. Such order shall be con-
firmed by the Court at its next
regular session. Unless a question
is presented of abuse of his
powers by the Director of the
Facility or his representative, the
Court shall reach its decision in
accordance with Section V, par-
agraph 2C. If such a question is
presented, the decision shall be
made in accordance with Section
V, paragraph 2B.
c. The Youth Service Board shall re-
tain its powers, as enumerated in
Chapter 120, section 12 of the Laws
of Massachusetts, insofar as they
concern children under confinement.
D. A representative of the Youth Service
Board Facility shall be present at all hear-
ings before the Court.
3. Right to Counsel.
The child shall have right to counsel at all
hearings before the juvenile court and the
Court for the Disposition of Juvenile Cases.
Comment: This subsection is spelled out in detail
in order to define clearly the powers of the dis-
positions body. In its division between the per-
missible disposition of cases of delinquency and
those of waywardness, the subsection is consistent
with the philosophy that "behavior circumstances"
should set limits on what kind of treatment may
be administered.
The power of the administrative agency to de-
termine whether or not the child is to be at liberty
or not, is circumscribed. As has already been
stated in another connection, it cannot, without
consulting the court, change a child's status from
that of liberty to that of confinement.
The divestment of the Youth Service Board of
its powers to change freely the status of a child
from liberty to confinement is compensated for by
the participation of clinicians in the body de-
termining disposition. Therefore, the need to
change the status of offenders should not occur too
frequently. When it does occur, the Youth Service
Board representative will have to go before the
court to obtain an order changing the status of the
child. This procedure, while allowing the Board
flexibility, protects the child from unnecessary in-
fringements on his liberty.
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